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Multistage games were introduced sometime ago and were studied mainly 
by Bellman in [l]. These multistage games may be considered not only to 
constitute an extension of a single-stage theory, but in many ways they may 
be considered to be more fundamental. The single-stage game may be 
conceived as a steady-state version of an original dynamic process, namely 
the multistage process. Generally, only two players were considered. Some 
important multistage processes have been elegantly studied by Shapley [7] 
and others. Another important part of game theory dealing with dynamic 
aspects of strategy games is the extensive theory of games where at each 
step only one player is making the decision on which all the future states 
will depend. Van Neumann and Morgenstern [8] and later Kuhn [3] and 
Gale-Stewart [2] have obtained important results in this direction. 
Only recently were n-person multistage games introduced in the natural 
context of mixed extensions of finite dynamic processes where all the players 
decide at all times the future of the game. Some results in extending E-points 
to these games can be found in [4] and [5]. 
However, the number of steps under consideration in the latter studies 
were finite. 
In this paper we aim to extend the study of multistage games arising as a 
mixed extension of a finite dynamic competitive process when the number 
of steps is infinite and we study the composition of equilibrium points. We 
obtain a result which allows us to find c-equilibrium points in the limit game 
by using finite multi-stage game approximations. 
1. Consider for the set of players N = {l,..., n} the corresponding 
finite strategy sets Z> at the first time and for each ur = (uir,..., u,‘) E F = 
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xioN 2: the compact strategy set Y,“(u’) in a euclidean space. For a given 
o1 E Z1 at the second time we have an n-person game 
P(d) = {Y&P), F,(d, a); i E N) 
where the payoff functions are considered continuous in 
U"E Y2(01) = )( Y,"(d). 
icN 
We can construct a game for the global situation having both steps in the 
following way: 
where the strategy sets are given by 
where ,&l is the set of mixed strategies on &I, and the payoff function is 
given by 
for any x1 E X&N zil and y2 E X U~oz~ Y,“(u’). 
We have the following result. 
THEOREM 1. If for all 01 E Z1, the games Y2(u1) have equilibrium points 
then f also has an equilibrium point. 
Proof. Let ~2 = (boa,..., jjS2(u1); ~1~21) be such a collection of 
equilibrium points. Consider the auxiliary game 
A = (Zi , Fi( *, T2( *)); i E N}. 
The mixed extension /i with expectations F,(xl, y2) has an equilibrium point 
$1. We want to see that the pair f = (9, ~a) is indeed an equilibrium point 
in 7. 
We have for each player i E N and any Xi1 E X’il 
F&v’, 7‘2) 3 F&l ,...) & , Xi’, %;+l )...) x,l, 7”) 
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= F&1 )..., &, ) xi , 5;+1 ,...) i&l; Y12 )...) JJf--, ) y:, j++l )..., 72) 
where the first inequality is provided by the equilibrium point in 3 and the 
remaining ones by the equilibrium point in Y2(ui). Q.E.D. 
In the case that payoff function is given by discounting factors, that is to say 
Fi(Ul, y2(01)) = F>(d) + Fi2(U1, Y”(4 
then the equilibrium point equation takes the following iterative form: 
2. Now we would like to apply the previous result in an iterative manner 
to multistage games which extend games given in extensive form. 
Let us consider a dynamic scheme of strategy sets parametrized by a time 
parameter k = T = {l,...}, given in a recursive manner as follows: Z>, 
the strategy set at time one is fixed and for each u1 E Z1 = XjGN &l at the 
second step we have a strategy set Zf(ul) for each player. Introducing the 
notation u(k) = (CT',..., u”) where for each 2 < I< k, 
uz E ZZ(ul,..., d-1) = x Ly(ul,..., uz--1) 
jEN 
then the strategy sets at the kth steps 
u:+l E Z;+‘(u(k)) 
are given recursively. We call gk the set of all u(k) and zS~ the set of all uk 
such that there is a u(k - 1) E gk--l with (u(k - l), uk) E gk. It is clear that 
9” = V&-1)&W Zk(u(k - 1)) w ere h V stands for the disjoint union 
590 = { ?a}. 
The payoff functions for a process having I steps are given stepwise; that 
is to say 
Biz(u(Z)) = i A,“(a(k)). 
k=l 
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h;ow we want to introduce the global game theoretical structure to such a 
dynamic scheme. Given a o(k - 1) E P-l, then the n-person game 
P(o(k - 1)) = {Z~J@(k - l)), A,“(., o(k - 1)); i E N} 
is clearly recursively defined and describes the conflict situation in the kth 
step once the stage u(k - 1) is reached. Therefore, its mixed extension 
F(u(k - 1)) = F”(u(k - 1)) = (@(a(k - l)), Fik(., u(k - 1)); i E N} 
is well defined too. Now looking backward one further step, we have that 
for a given u(k - 2) E 9k-2, in the (k - 1)th step the strategy sets are 
ZF-‘(u(k - 2)) and f or each uli-l E Zk-l we have for the next step the com- 
petition described by the game Fk(a(k - 1)). Therefore, we are facing a 
situation as that presented in the previous section. Applying the mentioned 
technique, the game 
T”(u(k - 2)) = +(u(k - 2)) @ pk(u(k - 2), u7+1) 
oK-‘&-‘(dk-2)) 
is clearly given. Iterating this procedure k - 2 more times, we obtain the game 
fk = fil @ r2(u(1))D~E~~(1)) f3(4), u”) @ -.. 
okz1 
x 0 p’“(u(k - 2), uk-l) 
ok-1EL‘k-1(o(k-2)) 
whose strategy sets are expressed as follows: 
X zik(a”(a(k - 2), uk--l). 
o”-‘&-%(k-2)) 
Calling fP(u(l)) and tii”(u(l)) the corresponding elements after the first 
term, in the respective sequences above, we can write 
f” = f1 @ Pk(d) = {ITi’; Eik; i E N) 
o’e? 
We call such a game behavioral mixed extension. 
By applying recursively the Theorem given above, we have for our sequence 
of behavioral mixed extension games the following fact. 
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THEOREM 2. For each 1, fz has an equilibrium point S E X jsN zjz. 
It is worth to remark at this point that the existence of such an equilibrium 
point cannot be obtained directly via Nash Theorem applied to the behavioral 
mixed extension rz since the payoff functions Biz are far from being linear 
in Xi' E Xi’. 
3. We now extend the dynamic scheme given above in the limit case 
when the sequence is infinite. 
Let 2P be the set of infinite sequences u = (al, S,...) such that each 
uh- E P(a(k - 1)). 
The behavioral mixed strategy sets for the limit extension game are defined 
naturally by 
Next we need to give the payoff functions. A given x E zrn = X jsN zirn 
induces for each I a global strategy x1 E ,??. The difference among expectations 
on these projections are bounded as follows: 
1 Ez(xz) - .?P(P)j < 
o@pax(z,m) I .,~g:::+, Ak(u(k)) I * 
max 
Therefore under the condition which we assume, that for each E > 0 there 
is an 1 such that 
Kiz = sup c 1 @(u(k))1 < E 
reFrn k=l+l 
for each ig N, the expectations values El(xl) converge to a limit 2$“(x) 
which is taken as the definition of the value of the payoff function on X. 
Thus, the limit game 
is obtained. 
Tm = {Etm, Eim; i E N} 
We want to see that one can obtain an c-equilibrium point in the limit 
game by means of a sequence of equilibrium points in the finite approximation 
games. 
THEOREM 3. For each E > 0 there is an .+equilibrium point x in rrn. 
Proof. Given E > 0, let 1 be such that Ki’ < 42 for each i E N. The 
game rz has an equilibrium point 9 E zz. Extending it to x E Em arbitrarily, 
we will prove that f is indeed an c-equilibrium point in the limit game fm. 
40915513-5 
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We have that 
and 
j E<“(x, )...) xiel ) xi ) wiTit1 ,..., g&n) - E$clZ )..., & ) xiz, 3:+1 )..., ~nz)~ 
.< sup f 1 @(a(k))] .< E/2 
oeP lc=Z+1 
for each i E N and each xi G&~ whose projection into ziz is xiz. By using 
these inequalities, the following hold 
E,“(X) > E&q - E/2 
3 E,“(qz ,..., & ) XIZ, %;+I ,...) TnZ) - E/2 
> E& )..., Tip1 ) xi , i$+l )...) q - E 
for any i E N and xi E ziim. Therefore, x E zw is an e-equilibrium point in fim. 
Q.E.D. 
Similar treatment can be performed in order to study more general concepts 
of stability as those introduced in [6], for the limit of multistages game. 
4. Now we would like to obtain some consequences in the case of zero- 
sum two-person multistage games. 
The payoff function for rz is given as 
EZ(XZ, y") = El(xl, yl) + c EZJ(al, XI(d), yZ(d)) X1(cJll) YW) 
Ok@ 
where xz ezIz and yz EZ%~. xz(ul) and xz(ul) are the projections of x2 and yz 
into zlz(d) and z2z(u1) respectively. EzJ is the expectation in the truncated 
game f&(d). 
Consequently, by callingfl the value in fz and fz-‘(ul) the value in fz(ul) 
then the optimality principle technically given in the recurrence procedure 
of obtaining the iterative saddle points will hold to 
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The sequence f converges to f a which clearly satisfies 
and moreover, following the arguments given above it is easy to see that 
f” = sup inf P(x, y) = inf sup P(x, y). 
&E,m y ~&al yeqm xG,m 
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